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ABSTRACT
Studies of take up in social insurance programs rarely distinguish between initial enrollment and
retention of beneficiaries. This paper shows that retention plays a meaningful role in incomplete
take up: despite knowledge of and eligibility for a near-cash public benefit, many participants
exit the program rather than complete administrative requirements. Using administrative data on
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) for multiple states, I show that over
half of entering households exit SNAP within one year of entry. Exits are concentrated in
key reporting and recertification months, when participants must submit substantial paperwork in
order to remain on the program. Combining administrative SNAP and Unemployment Insurance
(UI) records from the state of Michigan, I provide evidence that mechanical eligibility changes
cannot explain the extent of program exit. Finally, I demonstrate a substantial effect of
administrative requirements on retention by studying the staggered rollout of Michigan’s online
case management tool, which reduced exits for likely eligible applicants by approximately 10
percent around these key dates.
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Many households do not enroll in public assistance programs despite being eligible for
them. Estimates of take up among eligible households range from 34 percent for Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), to 67 percent for Medicaid, to 83 percent for the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (Ribar 2014). Yet, cross-sectional studies of
take up rarely distinguish between initial take up and retention in transfer programs. The purpose
of this paper is to illustrate the importance of understanding retention in at least one major
transfer program, and to test the extent to which policymakers may alter take up through policies
that affect retention.
In addition to demonstrating the relevance of specific policy tools, the study of retention
helps to distinguish between competing hypotheses on the causes of incomplete take up more
broadly. One view argues that incomplete take up is driven by a combination of low levels of
information about the benefits in question and low value for these benefits among eligible
beneficiaries. In this view, policymakers should primarily dedicate resources to outreach and
benefit design. An alternative view posits that incomplete take up is driven by high
administrative requirements on the part of beneficiaries, which may be “real” costs or behavioral
frictions. In this view, policymakers should dedicate resources to understanding and selectively
reducing administrative requirements. In the context of SNAP, this paper provides support for
the latter hypothesis: administrative requirements substantively affect take up, even among
potential beneficiaries who have experience with the benefit in question and value it at close to
its cash equivalent.
Previous efforts to understand retention in public assistance programs have been limited
for three reasons. First, much of the existing literature has focused on programs that provide
health insurance, in particular the Children’s Health Insurance Program and Medicaid (Dick et al
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2002; Sommers 2007; Sommers and Rosenbaum 2011). However, the value of maintaining
continuous enrollment in these programs is difficult to measure, especially since retroactive
enrollment is often possible and beneficiaries may not even know their coverage has lapsed until
they seek medical care. In contrast, the SNAP benefits I study are near-cash transfers that have
value to all beneficiaries.1 Failure to maintain benefits is salient in SNAP, since beneficiaries’
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) cards will stop working as soon as enrollment lapses and lost
benefits cannot be recovered.
Second, data limitations have slowed down research on retention. Survey data on SNAP
participation are notoriously unreliable, with common surveys underreporting participation by 30
percent or more (Meyer and Goerge 2010; Meyer and Mittag 2015). Other data sources, such as
the USDA “Quality Control” files, do not have the panel component necessary to study retention
(Ganong and Liebman 2017). Moreover, eligibility for SNAP is a complex function of many
types of income that cannot be measured precisely in any existing data set. To ameliorate these
data issues, I use SNAP administrative enrollment records from multiple states as well as merged
Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records for the state of Michigan. Although these
administrative data sources do not allow me to perfectly observe eligibility over time, they do
substantially reduce the extent of unobserved eligibility changes.
Third, researchers have found few clean empirical designs to study retention. In the
context of SNAP, most existing studies use difference-in-difference designs around state policy
changes over long time horizons (Ganong and Liebman 2017; Heflin and Mueser 2010;
Pomerleau 2013; Schwabish 2012). While these studies generally support some role for
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Hastings and Shapiro (2017) provide evidence that the vast majority of SNAP-eligible households spend
more on food than their SNAP benefits cover, implying that even the last dollar of SNAP benefits is considered
valuable by consumers.
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recertification procedures in explaining incomplete take up, they rely on cross-state aggregates or
survey data and require parallel trends assumptions across many states and a long time horizon.
This paper complements these studies by using administrative enrollment data and within-state
policy changes over a short time horizon.
By ameliorating these issues, I am able to make three distinct contributions. First, I
document that retention in SNAP is quite low. In the states for which suitable data exist,
typically over 50 percent of new SNAP enrollees drop out of the program within the first year.
Exits usually occur at key “reporting” and “recertification” months in which paperwork is
required, and usually last for an extended period of time. Second, I provide evidence that many
of these exits occur among households that remain eligible. Reported reasons for program exit
are overwhelmingly failure to submit paperwork rather than confirmed ineligibility, households
with and without earned income have similar rates of program exit, and benefit amounts (which
are directly tied to eligibility) change very little among households that do maintain benefits.
Explanations that do not involve substantial exit rates among eligible beneficiaries cannot easily
account for these facts. Third, I provide quasi-experimental evidence that administrative barriers
substantially affect retention, even among households that are very likely to have remained
eligible. Using the staggered roll out of online case management in 2009 across Michigan, I find
that the ability to monitor benefits and submit paperwork online reduced exits at key dates by
about 1.5 percentage points (over 10 percent) among likely eligible beneficiaries. These effects
are concentrated among nonelderly adults and at recertification months, when more detailed
documentation and an interview is required.
In addition to the papers mentioned above, this work complements a growing literature
studying how program design features affect take up among different types of beneficiaries. The
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theoretical literature has posited the importance of heterogeneous tastes correlated with
unobserved attributes (Nichols and Zeckhauser 1982), program complexity (Kleven and
Kopczuk 2011), and dynamic income manipulation (Pei 2017). A small body of empirical work
has used fine variation in experiments or quasi-experiments to explore the screening properties
of specific program design features (Bettinger et al. 2012; Deshpande and Li 2017; Ebenstein
and Stange 2010), although these papers focus on initial take up rather than retention. There is
also descriptive evidence suggesting that low retention in SNAP and public housing waiting lists
may be partially explained by low-income households moving frequently and therefore missing
important mailings (Mills et al. 2014; Waldinger 2018).
The paper will proceed as follows. First, I explain the institutional background of the
SNAP program and describe my data sources. I then use data from multiple states to document
that retention in SNAP is quite low. The next two sections provide descriptive evidence that
many of these exits are among eligible beneficiaries and quasi-experimental evidence that
lowering administrative requirements to maintain benefits reduced premature exits. The last
section provides a summary and conclusion.

BACKGROUND AND DATA
The SNAP Program
In a given month in 2011, Michigan’s SNAP program—formally called the Food
Assistance Program (FAP)—served almost 2 million individuals in about 1 million unique
households. This represents almost 20 percent of Michigan’s population, which is only slightly
higher than the nationwide analog: in July 2011, SNAP served about 15 percent of the U.S.
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population (Ganong and Liebman 2017). Figure 1 shows Michigan’s total caseload in each
month.2
The core aspects of the SNAP program are the same across all U.S. states. Each month,
households enrolled in the program get money loaded onto an Electronic Benefits Transfer
(EBT) card, which they can use to buy most food items at grocery or convenience stores.
Households of a given size may receive a benefit amount up to a maximum monthly benefit that
is set at the federal level each fiscal year. However, benefits are reduced as household income
rises, so many households receive less than the full benefit amount. To compute benefit amounts,
households may first exempt a small amount of income by claiming specific deductions (e.g., for
child support or rent). For each dollar of monthly unearned income in excess of those deductions,
monthly SNAP benefits fall by 30 cents. For each dollar of monthly earned income in excess of
those deductions, monthly SNAP benefits fall by 24 cents. If benefits have not already been
reduced to zero, households are ineligible to receive benefits if their gross income (before
deductions) is above 130 percent of the federal poverty line or their net income (after deductions)
is above 100 percent of the federal poverty line.3 Most state agencies do not independently verify
beneficiary income using other agencies’ administrative records, but do require beneficiaries to
submit documentation (e.g., W-2s) in order to limit the scope of misreporting. Figure 2 shows
benefit amounts in real 2011 dollars for the sample of Michigan households I construct below.
While monthly benefits can be as low as $20 and as high as $650 for large families, the majority
of households receive monthly benefits between $100 and $200.

2

The SNAP program considers a household to be “a group of people who . . . buy food and prepare meals
together” (fns.usda.gov/snap/facts-about-snap). However, elderly and disabled individuals are often able to split into
their own separate cases, even if they live with others. In this paper, I use “households” and “cases” as synonyms, so
that SNAP households do not necessarily align with living arrangements
3
In practice, the minimum benefit amount is $16 per month.
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Every state also requires beneficiaries to complete a periodic recertification to confirm
that they remain eligible for benefits. The specifics of this procedure vary by state, but most
nonelderly adults must recertify every 3, 6, or 12 months. Recertification requires extensive
paperwork, verification of income and deductions, and some type of interview. States with
longer recertification periods often collect slightly less extensive verifications halfway through
the beneficiaries’ certification period, in a process called mid-certification reporting. In
Michigan, where my quasi-experiment takes place, the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) mails a mid-certification reporting form to all households with earned income
(according to their most recent records) during the fifth month of benefits. The household has
two weeks to fill out this form by providing updated household information and proof of income
(e.g., pay stubs, child support statements). Failure to return this form before the first of the
following month results in the termination of benefits.
In the eleventh month of receiving benefits, Michigan DHHS mails a more extensive
recertification form to all households, regardless of earned income. In addition to similar
paperwork and income verification, recertification requires a full verification of all deductions
(e.g., proof of rent payments or medical bills) and, traditionally, a face-to-face interview at the
county DHHS office. This interview is prescheduled for a date in the middle of the month and
must be completed before the first of the subsequent calendar month. The interview typically
takes slightly less than an hour, not including travel time to each county’s DHHS headquarters,
and gives the beneficiary a chance to confirm or explain their eligibility along each criterion.
While individuals could theoretically request to do the interview by phone or reschedule,
discussions with Michigan DHHS officials suggest that this was very rare: the vast majority of
households either travelled to DHHS for their originally scheduled interview or failed to
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recertify. There are two notable exceptions to these rules. First, cases with very unstable
circumstances and no income (e.g., homeless individuals without stable contact information) are
sometimes given recertification periods of less than six months (but at least three months) at the
case workers’ discretion. Second, households in which all members are elderly (60+) or disabled,
as judged by DHHS, have longer reporting and recertification periods: they must report in their
eleventh month regardless of income and must recertify in their twenty-third month. Households
must repeatedly report or recertify at these regular intervals.4
Michigan’s SNAP program is unique in two other ways that facilitate this analysis. Many
states have asset tests for all beneficiaries and/or three-month time limits for nonworking AbleBodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs in SNAP jargon). From 2005 through 2011,
Michigan’s SNAP program had neither. This helps to limit the scope of exit due to unobserved
eligibility changes in my data.
Michigan Data
My primary data set consists of linked SNAP and UI administrative data from the state of
Michigan. The SNAP data contain a payment record for every individual on the program in
every month of participation between January 2005 and November 2011. The data also contain
information on participation, household structure, demographics, benefit amounts, and a unique
identifier that can be used to track the same individual across multiple spells or cases. I link this
file to quarterly UI wage records for every individual on a SNAP case, spanning from 2005Q1
through 2010Q3. To construct the total quarterly earnings associated with a SNAP case, I
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In Michigan, elderly or disabled households with non-SSA and non-SSI income are also on a 12-month
recertification schedule. However, only 6 percent of elderly or disabled households have any earned income in the
UI records. I consider all cases with only elderly or disabled individuals to be on a 24-month recertification schedule
as a reasonable approximation.
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aggregate earnings from all jobs for all individuals aged 18 or older on a SNAP case in that
month.
I classify each SNAP case into one of three categories: (1) ABAWDs are cases consisting
entirely of nondisabled individuals aged 18–59, (2) parents are cases consisting of one or more
adults aged 18–59 together with one or more children aged 17 or below, and (3) elderly/disabled
are cases consisting entirely of individuals either aged over 60 and/or classified as disabled.
Since the SNAP data do not include an indicator for disability status, I use linked administrative
data from Michigan’s Medicaid program (formally, the Medical Assistance program) and
consider a beneficiary to have a disability if they are blind, disabled, or otherwise receiving
Medicaid through the Supplemental Security Income program. Over 99 percent of case-month
observations fall into one of these three categories.5
I then divide each household’s history of SNAP participation into distinct spells, defined
as periods of contiguous monthly SNAP participation. Unfortunately, case identifiers in the raw
data sometimes change across months due to data storage conventions. To follow a case over
time, I identify individuals marked as the case head in the raw data and follow their participation
over time, linking nonheads to that case using within-month case identifiers. This technique will
falsely consider a household to have left the program when a case head leaves or becomes a
nonhead while other household members continue on. In practice, case heads identify households
remarkably well, in part because there is only one adult in almost 80 percent of cases in my
sample. Individuals who first enter the data as a case head remain as case heads in 98 percent of
participating months, while individuals who first enter the data as nonheads become heads in less
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Case months that do not fall into one of these three categories are usually either cases consisting of one
17-year-old or cases where elderly beneficiaries have chosen to join cases with nonelderly adults.
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than 3 percent of participating months.6 I further allay concerns about following case heads by
corroborating my descriptive results with administrative data from six other states, for which I
follow case identifiers instead of case heads.
I consider a SNAP spell to have started or restarted if a case head begins receiving SNAP
benefits after two months of nonparticipation.7 Since my data start on January 1, 2005, my
sample therefore consists of households that started a new spell on or after March 1, 2005.
Because I ignore cases that are ongoing at the beginning of 2005, my sample is substantially
smaller in early years relative to later years, as illustrated in Figure A1. I consider a SNAP spell
to have ended when the case head stops receiving SNAP benefits for one full calendar month or
longer. The decision to ignore within-month churn is helpful both for data reasons and to focus
on costlier forms of program exit, but it is worth noting that within-month churn is reasonably
common (Mills et al. 2014).8
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample. The sample captures 1.1 million
households over almost 1.5 million unique spells. It consists of half ABAWDs, one-third parents,
and one-sixth elderly/disabled cases. Benefit amounts are generally largest for parents and
smallest for elderly/disabled households. Over the whole sample, about one-third of case-months
include an individual with UI-covered earnings.

6
In the rare scenario when two original case heads join the same case, I choose to end the spell of the case
head that entered my sample later and drop the whole case if the case heads joined SNAP at the same time.
7
This method is intentionally conservative, as it will not start a new spell after a single-month gap in
participation. This helps to ensure that I do not mistakenly record new spells due to data entry errors, but also
excludes some legitimate spells from my sample. This choice does not drive my results: gaps between participation
are longer than one month for 90 percent of exits (see Figure 4), and all results are robust to using only each case’s
first spell.
8
The data do not include an indicator for within-month churn, and estimating churn using single-month
dips in benefit amounts would create measurement error in my exit variable.
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USDA Data
As a second source of data, I use SNAP administrative records for 2011–2012 for six
other states.9 The data were created for a study conducted by the Urban Institute (Mills et al.
2014) and generously provided to me by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services (FNS). These
records provide comprehensive monthly case-level data on every SNAP participant that appeared
at any point in fiscal year 2011 (October 2010 through September 2011). The data then follow
each case in this sample through December 2012. To maintain comparability to the Michigan
data, I restrict the USDA sample to households that began participating in SNAP between
December 2010 and September 2011 after two or more months of nonparticipation. Unlike the
data from Michigan, the USDA data do include pre-constructed case categories and report
monthly earned and unearned income directly from case records.10 However, the USDA data
also include a much shorter panel and are not linkable to other administrative records.
In many respects, the case composition in each of these states is very similar to the case
composition in Michigan: ABAWDs are generally the most common category, the majority of
participating households have no earned income, and in most states about one-third of cases
facing recertification exit for one or more months. Appendix Table A1 provides more detail on
each state’s sample.

THE LEVEL OF RETENTION IN SNAP
I first show that retention is low across many states’ SNAP programs. Figure 3 shows
survival curves for SNAP enrollment in Michigan by following each household for 24 months
9

These states are Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Texas, and Virginia.
These income sources are not substitutes for independent UI wage records, since they only reflect income
changes that beneficiaries report to SNAP administrators.
10
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after their first enrollment in my sample window. The solid black line shows the percent of
households that are enrolled at each month relative to their entry month, while the dotted red line
shows the percent that have continuously remained enrolled in the program since entry. In
Michigan, over half of SNAP entrants exit at some point within their first year, and over 40
percent of SNAP entrants are not on the program at their one-year anniversary. There are some
exits in the first few months since entry, owing to a mix of households self-reporting substantial
changes to household structure or income (as is legally required) and some households with very
unstable circumstances given special, short recertification periods. However, exits are heavily
concentrated in the sixth month, when households with earnings must complete mid-certification
reporting, and the twelfth month, when most households must complete recertification.
Figure 4 splits the sample into ABAWDs, parents, and elderly/disabled cases, showing
the fraction of each group that remains on the SNAP program continuously since their initial
entry into my sample.11 ABAWDs and parents exit at higher rates than the disabled/elderly,
likely due to a combination of having more frequent eligibility changes and shorter
recertification periods. Parents are especially likely to exit at six months, since many parents
work (see Table 1) and therefore must complete mid-certification reporting, while ABAWDs are
especially likely to exit at twelve months. Appendix Table A2 shows the characteristics of cases
that stay or exit at recertification, reporting, or in a given interior month. While cases that exit do
have higher earnings and smaller benefits than cases that stay, these differences are modest: the
majority of households that exit at recertification have no earned income, and average benefits of
exiting households are about $200 per month.
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This figure characterizes cases based on their category at program entry, in order to prevent
compositional changes from affecting the series.
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These magnitudes are not unique to Michigan. Using the supplemental USDA data from
FY2011, I construct series analogous to Figure 4 for each of the six available states. Figure 5
shows the probability of continuous survival for each category of beneficiaries in Virginia, which
has SNAP policies similar to those in Michigan.12 As in Michigan, the majority of ABAWDs and
parents in Virginia exit within one year, as do a sizable fraction of elderly/disabled households.
Appendix Figures A2–A6 show similar figures for the other states. While specific policies and
magnitudes vary by state, in all states exits are common and are usually concentrated at reporting
and recertification months. In all states, ABAWDs have the highest rate of exit, while
elderly/disabled households have the lowest.
When households exit, they usually do not return to the program promptly. Revisiting the
data from Michigan, Figure 6 considers all instances in which a household exits and plots how
many months pass before that case returns to the sample. Among cases that leave the program
for a full calendar month or longer, just under 10 percent of them leave for a single month. Over
50 percent leave the program for a full year or longer. Since this paper is primarily concerned
with lasting exits from the program rather than (noisier) short-term churn, my subsequent
baseline specifications consider exits that last for three months or longer.
I also plot hazard rates of program exit during reporting and recertification months. To
calculate hazard rates, I consider all cases with continuous monthly benefits until reporting or
recertification, where I impute reporting and recertification months by a case’s current household
structure and UI-covered quarterly earnings.13 I then calculate what fraction of these cases have
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Like Michigan, Virginia in 2011 had 12-month recertification for most cases and 24-month
recertification for elderly or disabled cases without earnings. Unlike Michigan in my sample period, Virginia did
have an asset test in 2011.
13
While the raw data from my six state sample explicitly mark recertification months, the data from
Michigan do not.
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no recording SNAP benefits for three subsequent months. Figure 7 shows these hazard rates over
time for my sample of Michigan beneficiaries. In a given month, between 15 and 25 percent of
households facing recertification exit for 3+ months, while between 10 percent and 20 percent of
households facing reporting exit for 3+ months.
In sum, retention in SNAP is consistently low across years, states, and types of cases.
However, it is not clear whether exits are primarily due to program requirements that deter
eligible beneficiaries, or whether exits are a symptom of the program effectively shedding
beneficiaries who have become ineligible since their last contact with SNAP administrators. In
the next section, I provide evidence that exits are not purely due to changes in households’
eligibility.

EVIDENCE OF EXITS AMONG ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES
I next provide evidence that a high fraction of exits in SNAP are among eligible
beneficiaries, implying that low retention is not simply a symptom of periodically screening out
ineligible beneficiaries. Given the eligibility criteria described above, reliably predicting
eligibility at the household level would require accurate, linked data on many disparate sources
of income and expenses. To my knowledge, no such data source exists. However, my
administrative data sources allow me to produce three pieces of novel evidence that are difficult
to reconcile with a simple eligibility story. Taken together, this evidence suggests that a
substantial fraction of exiting households remain eligible for benefits.
Most Exits Are Due to Missed Deadlines
I first document that the main reason for case closure is not explicit ineligibility, but
rather because households did not complete the necessary procedures to recertify. Two states in
13

my USDA sample, Virginia and Idaho, include indicators for the reason each case was closed. I
convert these codes into reasons implying missed deadlines, reasons implying ineligibility, and
other or missing reasons. For each month of a SNAP spell, I plot the hazard rate of subsequently
exiting SNAP for three months or longer by reason. Figure 8 shows this figure for Virginia,
while Appendix Figure A7 shows this figure for Idaho. For both states, exits are concentrated
around reporting and recertification periods, and the vast majority of cases cite missed deadlines
rather than determined ineligibility. While it is possible that some households may choose not to
complete the recertification process because they know they have become ineligible, my next
two pieces of evidence suggest that this is not likely to be the case.
Likely Eligible Households Exit at High Rates
As a second piece of evidence for frequent exits among eligible beneficiaries, I show that
restricting my sample of Michigan SNAP beneficiaries to those that likely remained eligible has
little effect on exit rates at recertification. Figure 9 shows the hazard rate of exits at
recertification for Michigan households with less than $100 of UI-covered earnings in the quarter
in which they recertify, and less than $100 of UI-covered earnings in the following quarter.14
Hazard rates of households with consistent negligible UI-covered earnings are almost identical to
hazard rates of other households.
I also construct a sample of beneficiaries who are especially likely to have remained
eligible around reporting or recertification, which I use as my primary sample in the quasiexperiments in the next section. This sample consists of households with heads aged 25 or over
(to avoid students who only use SNAP during the school year), benefit amounts greater than $50
14

Earnings and benefit amounts are inflated to real 2011 dollars using the monthly Consumer Price Index.
Because I only observe household composition for active SNAP cases, I construct next quarter’s household earnings
by assuming that household structure remains constant.
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just prior to reporting or recertification, and quarterly earnings changes from the UI data that
would not have fully eliminated the household’s benefits.15 Approximately 60 percent of cases
satisfy these criteria. Figure 10 shows the hazard rates for households inside and outside of this
sample. Exit rates for households that satisfy this reasonably restrictive “likely eligible” criteria
are at most a few percentage points lower than in the full sample, and still lie consistently within
10–20 percent of all potential recertifiers.
While changes in earnings do not easily explain high exit rates, factors that I do not
observe in the data may also affect eligibility. Some events, such as moving out-of-state or death,
cause sudden disqualifications rather than changes in benefit amounts. However, these changes
are rare. Data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that just under 3 percent
of households below the poverty line have moved from a different state in the past year. Less
than 1 percent of SNAP case heads in my Michigan sample die within one year after entry.
Benefit Amounts Change Little for Those Who Stay
More common unobserved factors that may disqualify households from SNAP are
unearned income changes, changes to deductions (e.g., rent or child support), and changes to
household structure. All of these affect benefit amounts incrementally rather than triggering
sudden ineligibility. Therefore, if changes of this nature are common among SNAP beneficiaries,
they should induce benefit changes for SNAP households that successfully recertify.
The third piece of evidence suggesting substantial exits among the eligible is the fact that
benefit changes among continuing beneficiaries are very small. Figure 11 shows a histogram of
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In particular, I calculate the change in UI-covered quarterly earnings since the household was last
required to enter, report, or recertify. I then estimate the change in monthly earnings by dividing quarterly earnings
changes by three. I keep the household in my sample only if the estimated monthly earnings change would not have
reduced their SNAP benefits to below $10 according to the 24 percent tax on earned income.
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benefit changes (as a percent of benefits before recertification) for households that successfully
recertify, using pooled data from all six states in my USDA records. Among households that
successfully recertify, most have the same or higher benefit amounts, while only a small fraction
of recertifiers experience substantial benefit decreases. This suggests that unobserved changes in
income and deductions play a very limited role in explaining low retention. Appendix Figure A8
shows that similar results hold in Michigan, while Figure A9 shows that similar results hold
among households that leave for one to three months at recertification. Even if the factors
determining benefit amounts tend to change little within a given year, it is possible that exits are
concentrated among households with low benefit amounts (who are therefore on the margin of
eligibility). Appendix Figure A10 shows that this is not the case in Michigan: exits are common
even for households with substantial benefits at stake.
While I am unable to precisely estimate the percent of eligible beneficiaries that exit the
SNAP program, these three pieces of evidence are difficult to reconcile with a story in which
almost all exits are simply due to eligibility changes. Instead, this evidence suggests that a
substantial fraction of eligible beneficiaries exit the SNAP program at reporting and
recertification periods. In the following section, I present quasi-experimental evidence that
changes to recertification procedures can have substantial effects on the number and composition
of retained beneficiaries.

THE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
So far, this paper has documented low retention in the SNAP program, even among
households that remain eligible for substantial near-cash benefits. This evidence suggests that
spreading information about a social insurance program and offering benefits that participants
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value would not be sufficient to generate near-complete take up. This section offers an
alternative policy tool by showing quasi-experimental evidence that reducing administrative
requirements for beneficiaries can meaningfully increase program retention.
In particular, I study the staggered rollout of an online case management tool in Michigan
throughout 2009. This tool reduced the hazard rate of exit at reporting or recertification by about
10 percent among my likely eligible sample. Effects are concentrated among nonelderly adults
and are driven by lower exits in recertification months rather than in reporting months. The latter
fact suggests that logistical hassles of interviews and collecting nonstandard documentation were
larger barriers than the time cost of paperwork.
Today, the “Bridges” online case management system allows users to apply for SNAP,
recertify, check the status of their benefits, change personal information, find their case worker’s
contact information, or read letters from DHHS at any time on the Internet. The ability to
perform these tasks online at any time may substantially reduce the frequency of errors during
the reporting or recertification process.
Michigan DHHS rolled out the first iteration of this system incrementally throughout the
state from August 2008 through August 2009, with most rollouts occurring between March and
August 2009. Figure 12 shows the schedule of the rollout, which occurred in different sections of
the state in sequence: most of western Michigan had online capabilities in March, rural northern
Michigan in May, southeast Michigan in June, and Wayne County (Detroit) in August.16
I denote calendar month by t, the month of local website introduction by T, and
the relative month since local website introduction by k. To measure effect on the hazard
rate of exits at reporting of recertification, I pool all reporters and recertifiers in my
16

The expanded pilot counties released the online interface through late January and early February 2009.
My empirical specification assigns the date of introduction as January 2009 for these counties.
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sample, collapse individual level data to the county-month level, and run the following
regression on counties c in month t:
∑

1

I cluster standard errors at the county level. In my main specifications, the vector of control
variables

includes household group shares; shares for the race and gender of the household

head; and cubic polynomials in the county unemployment rate (from BLS Local Area
Unemployment Statistics), mean household quarterly earnings, mean benefit amounts, mean age,
and mean household size.17 The specific choice of controls matters very little for my results. I
also group relative months

6 or

6, thereby restricting pretrends and causal effects

outside of a six-month rolling window around the policy change.18
Figure 13 plots the coefficients

and 95 percent confidence intervals for

∈

5,5 .

The baseline hazard rate of exits for 3+ months among the likely eligible sample is 10.8 percent.
The point estimates suggest that the online interface reduced these hazards by just over 1
percentage point, or approximately 10 percent.19
To understand the channels through which the online interface reduced program exit, I
examine heterogeneity in this effect across multiple dimensions. Figure 14 plots

17

after

I cut outliers with more than $10,000 in quarterly earnings, more than $1,000 in monthly benefits, aged
over 100 years, or with more than 10 household members.
18
While the specific window I choose affects my results very little, some restriction is necessary to avoid
collinearity arising from the fact that T = t − k. I select to restrict relative month coefficient outside of a six-month
rolling window around the policy change as a compromise between the benefits of a longer rolling window (a more
flexible specification) and a shorter rolling window (which yields more precise estimates of calendar month
coefficients).
19
For completeness, Appendix Figure A11 shows results of the same regression with the hazard rate of
exits for 1+ month on the left-hand side. These coefficients display a distinct spike in relative month k = −1,
reflecting a pattern in the raw data that may be due to data collection issues when transferring to the new online
system. This provides an additional reason to consider exits for 3+ months in my baseline specifications. However,
comparing the pre- and postperiod hazard rates in Figure A11 still suggests the 1 percentage point (just under 10
percent) effect that we see in baseline specifications.

18

restricting the sample to reporting or recertification months, respectively. The effect comes
entirely from reduced exits at recertification, suggesting that logistical issues play a large role in
program exit over and above the time costs of paperwork. Appendix Figure A12 shows that the
effect comes entirely from large reductions in exits among nonelderly adults (ABAWDs and
parents). I find no evidence that effect sizes depend on household income or previous experience
with the program (Appendix Figures A13 and A14).

CONCLUSION
Despite a long literature studying take up of transfer programs, very little research has
been dedicated to understanding retention in these programs. In addition to providing specific
policy tools to affect take up, credible studies of program retention can yield insights about the
causes of incomplete take up.
This paper shows that retention is a meaningful margin of take up in its own right: many
households that remain eligible for substantial near-cash benefits nevertheless exit the program
when faced with logistically difficult recertification procedures. I show this in three steps. First, I
document that retention is low in the SNAP program across many states and household types. In
Michigan, for example, over 50 percent of newly entering households exit the program for one
month or longer within the first year of participation, while 40 percent are not on the program at
their one-year anniversary of entry. Second, I provide evidence that low retention in SNAP is not
only a result of changes in eligibility. Rejected recertifications are almost always denied because
of incomplete applications rather than ineligibility, households with low and consistent UIcovered earnings still exit at high rates, and patterns of benefit levels suggest that changes in
other eligibility-relevant factors are modest. Third, I show that the staggered rollout of online

19

case management in Michigan reduced the hazard rate of program exit at key dates by
approximately 10 percent for likely eligible beneficiaries. Effects were concentrated among
ABAWDs and parents at recertification, suggesting that logistical hurdles serve as a greater
barrier than the time cost of paperwork.
These findings highlight that low retention in social programs—even among the
eligible—is a widespread phenomenon with implications for take up. As administrative data
linkages continue to proliferate, developing a deeper understanding of program retention and its
implications will be an exciting direction for future research.
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Figure 1 Michigan SNAP Caseload

Figure 2 Monthly Benefit Amounts in Michigan SNAP
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Figure 3 Retention in Michigan SNAP

Figure 4 Retention in Michigan SNAP by Household Type
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Figure 5 Retention in Virginia SNAP by Household Type

Figure 6 Number of Months between Exiting and Regaining to Benefits
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Figure 7 Hazard Rate of Exits at Recertification and Reporting

Figure 8 Hazard Rate of Exit for 3+ by Reason, Virginia
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Figure 9 Hazard Rates at Recertification, Low Earners

Figure 10 Hazard Rates at Recertification, Likely Eligible Sample
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Figure 11 Benefit Changes Among Successful Recertifiers, USDA States

Figure 12 Rollout of Michigan’s Online Case Management System
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Figure 13 Effect of Online Case Management on Exit Hazards

Figure 14 Effect of Online Case Management on Reporting vs Recertification
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Table 1 Michigan Sample Characteristics

All

ABAWDs

Parents

Elderly/
Disabled

Percent of observations

100

50

35

15

Unique cases (000s)

1,104

653

323

121

Unique spells (000s)

1,478

842

483

144

Average case size

1.9

1.2

3.4

1.1

Percent with one member

57.2

86.6

0

92.5

Percent with female head

59.8

42.8

84.7

58.0

Percent with white head

63.9

61.2

68.5

62.4

25th percentile benefit amount
(2011 $)

134

140

218

49

75th percentile benefit amount
(2011 $)

301

203

510

187

Percent with earnings

37

34

56

6

Average quarterly earnings
(conditional on positive, 2011 $)

3,452

2,611

4,206

1,856

NOTE: Table 1 reports characteristics for my sample of Michigan SNAP enrollees over all enrolled months. The
sample includes all households that enter Michigan’s SNAP program after March 2005 after two or more months of
nonparticipation from entry until November 2011. Reporting and recertification are imputed using each household’s
entry month, household structure, and UI-covered earnings. Earnings statistics only use data up to October 2010,
after which UI data is unavailable. Earnings and benefit amounts are inflated to January 2011 dollars using the
monthly urban Consumer Price Index. The section titled “Michigan Data” in the text contains more details about the
sample
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Appendix Figures
Figure A1 Michigan SNAP Sample

Figure A2 Retention in Florida SNAP
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Figure A3 Retention in Idaho SNAP

Figure A4 Retention in Illinois SNAP
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Figure A5 Retention in Maryland SNAP

Figure A6 Retention in Texas SNAP
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Figure A7 Hazard Rate of Exit for 3+ Months by Reason, Idaho

Figure A8 Small Benefit Changes for Stayers in Michigan
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Figure A9 Small Benefit Changes for Churners in (Pooled) USDA States

Figure A10 Hazard Rates of Exit at Recertification, by Benefit Amounts
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Figure A11 Effect of Online Interface on Exits for 1+ Month

Figure A12 Effect of Online Interface, by Household Type
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Figure A13 Effect of Online Interface, by Household Earnings

Figure A14 Effect of Online Interface, by Program Experience
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Appendix Tables
Table A1 FNS Sample Characteristics

FL

ID

IL

MD

TX

VA

Unique cases (000s)

591.2

36.1

233.3

109.9

647.9

117.4

Percent ABAWDs

52

42

41

32

24

43

Percent parents

16

35

31

29

49

35

Percent elderly/disabled

29

19

25

35

20

18

Percent alone

65

53

58

60

42

56

25th percentile benefit amount

124

167

153

106

118

146

75th percentile benefit amount

229

367

330

279

367

342

Percent with earnings

26

36

19

27

38

30

Average monthly earnings
(conditional on positive)

1,121

1,001

1,082

1,207

1,141

981

Percent with unearned income

42

37

49

48

42

41

Average monthly unearned
income (conditional on positive)

789

763

863

810

757

720

Percent leaving at recertification

36

38

56

33

36

23

NOTE: Table A1 reports characteristics of each state’s USDA sample across all active enrollment months
between December 2010 and November 2012. For my purposes, the USDA sample includes all households
that entered SNAP between December 2010 and September 2011 after nonparticipation for two or more
months. Benefit amounts and income are in nominal terms due to the short time frame. The section titled
“USDA Data” in the text contains more details about the sample.
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Table A2 Characteristics of Stayers vs Exiters
Stay at Leave at Stay at Leave at Stay at Leave at
recert. recert. reporting reporting interior interior
Percent of observations

78

22

83

17

97

3

Percent ABAWDs

48

68

36

43

54

53

Percent parents

44

28

45

45

34

42

Percent elderly/disabled

8

5

19

13

11

5

Average case size

2.1

1.7

2.2

2.2

1.9

2.1

Average benefit amount (2011 $)

258

192

231

164

211

218

Percent with earnings

37.5

45.1

82.7

88.5

41.9

55.9

Average quarterly earnings
(conditional on positive, 2011 $)

3,232

4,589

3,444

4,936

3,372

4,494

Percent with earnings next quarter

37.8

40.2

72.8

79.2

42.6

48.0

Average next quarter earnings
(conditional on positive, 2011 $)

3,431

4,916

4,015

5,314

3,887

5,581

NOTE: Table A2 reports characteristics of those who leave or stay at key dates in the Michigan sample,
taken across all relevant months. The sample includes all households that enter Michigan’s SNAP program
after March 2005 after two or more months of nonparticipation from entry until November 2011. Reporting
and recertification are imputed using each household’s entry month, household structure, and UI-covered
earnings. Earnings statistics only use data up to October 2010, after which UI data is unavailable. Earnings
and benefit amounts are inflated to January 2011 dollars using the monthly urban Consumer Price Index.
The section titled “Michigan Data” in the text contains more details about the sample.
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